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Failure of Play on Asset Disposals and Share Buybacks: 
Application of Game Theory in the International Hotel Market 
Abstract 
The principal purpose of this study has been to investigate the impact of an asset disposal 
strategy, often coupled with share repurchase programs, by international hotel companies on 
financial performance, earnings stability and share values. Utilising ratio analysis, stock returns 
and risk-adjusted measures, the study analyses the differences in performance, stability and 
market valuations between asset light and more capital intensive hotel companies. The findings 
of the study indicate negligible differences in most accounting measures of earnings growth 
and stability between asset light hotel companies and traditional hotel companies with 
significant holdings of owned or leased property. Drawing on game theory, we conclude that 
international hotel companies dispose of their assets in an effort to manipulate financial markets 
and make their stocks more attractive to investors and traders. Notwithstanding the absence of 
significant differentiation in accounting measures of performance fundamentals, market based 
measures show that hotel groups failed in the aim of manipulating financial markets. This study 
recommends avoiding playing this game as dual asset light/share repurchase strategy generated 
superior risk-weighted returns to that of more capital intensive traditional hotel companies 
across the period of the study. 
Keywords: Game theory; international hotel; repurchase strategy; financial performance; risk-
adjusted measures; market stability 
 
Introduction 
The larger International hotel chains (IHCs) based in the United States and Europe have 
adopted a strategy, that has led them to dispose of much of their owned real estate, often 
retaining management agreements on the properties – sale and manage back (SMB’s) (Van 
Ginneken, 2011). Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and Private Equity Funds have been 
rapidly acquiring major hotel properties and hotel companies released onto the market. 
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According to Bloomberg calculations (Yu, 2013, Yu et al., 2013; 2014) funds have seen their 
hotel investments triple in value in many cases. REITs have matched the performance of private 
equity funds. A study by the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts found that 
REITs outperformed private equity over the last full real estate market cycle, in both bull and 
bear markets, from 1990 to 2007 (NAREIT, 2010).  
Sale and leaseback transactions were a precursor to the development of asset disposal strategies 
pursued by the major US and European hotel chains.  The sale and leaseback of real property 
has been commonplace within the hotel industry as well as other industries in recent decades 
(Whittaker, 2008). Rapid domestic and international expansion of hotel chains fee based 
business has been enabled by franchising (Contractor and Kundu, 1998). A strategy that hotel 
chains, as with earlier sale and lease back financing, share with a number of consumer based 
businesses across a broad range of industries (Brown et al., 2003; Dev et al., 2002).  
Management and ownership structures in the hotel industry are more stratified than is typically 
the case in other industries (Melissen et al., 2016). Hotel investors entering into a franchise 
agreement with a major brand often contract for operating services with a hotel management 
company. The major chains offer property management services on the basis of a percentage 
of revenues and normally a share of profits that steps up as performance thresholds are reached. 
Management agreements give operators’ a significant element of control over hotel operations 
without the cyclical risk exposures entailed in ownership or leasing of hotel properties.  As 
IHCs divested of property assets by way of outright disposal or sale and leaseback 
arrangements, fee-based business models have become the platform for growth. Capital 
released by adoption of these asset-light strategies has often been returned to investors by way 
of share buy-backs and special dividends. In contrast to lease rental obligations that appear as 
a liability on the balance sheet, a management agreement with its associated future income 
stream is interpreted as an intangible asset (Page, 2007). This difference impacts on the way 
investors value hotel operators’ shares. Nonetheless, some operators’ continue to favour the 
leaseback model that enables them to retain the benefit of all the hotel revenues and profits 
rather than a relatively lower percentage of both. 
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Large scale share buyback programs have been undertaken concurrently with the significant 
asset disposals of recent decades. Marriott began a program of asset disposals in earnest 
following US legislation enabling corporations to repurchase their own shares in 1982.  By 
2010 it had divested all but a handful of its properties. The UK based IHG group sold the great 
majority of its stock of approximately 200 owned properties from 2003 to 2013 raising $10 
billion and returning much of the proceeds to shareholders in the form of share buybacks and 
special dividends (Roper, 2016). The period of relatively low interest rates that followed the 
bursting of the dot-com bubble in 1999, coincided with a period of rapid appreciation in the 
value of stock markets and real estate in general. Hotel properties in prime locations saw 
spectacular gains in some cases. London’s Ritz hotel, for example, quadrupled in value from 
2001 to 2005 (Anon, 2010). While IHCs could benefit from sales at top of the market prices, it 
is also perhaps worthy of note that a substantial element of the gains were used for share 
repurchases at top of the market prices. Share repurchases reached new peaks in 2007, just 
before the financial crash, whereas in 2009 when shares were at their cheapest few firms were 
buying (Economist, 2014). 
Following the recovery from the financial crisis of 2007-08, large cap US corporates have 
accelerated share buybacks reaching new peaks. A Reuters report showed that almost 60% of 
the 3,297 publically traded non-financial US companies they examined have bought back their 
shares since 2010 (Brettel et al., 2015). The purpose of this study is to assess the relative impact 
of asset disposal and share buyback (ADSB hereafter) strategies on the performance and 
stability of IHCs, during a period of economic recovery.  The study compares the performance 
of four asset light publically traded hotel companies with a control group comprised of two 
more capital intensive traditional hotel companies that own or lease a significant element of 
their hotel room inventory.  
To assess the impact of these strategies, the study undertakes an analysis of traditional 
accounting ratios to measure corporate financial return (return on assets –ROA; return on 
capital employed – ROCE; net profit margins – NPM and risk (variances of the return 
variables). Adjusted net profit margins (ANPM) are utilized to assess the proportionate share 
of hotel earnings accruing to IHCs. Additionally, a market focused measure of risk and return 
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based on the efficient market hypothesis (Gu, 1994) is employed to measure risk and financial 
performance. To derive a risk-adjusted performance measure we undertake an analysis based 
on the Sharpe index 
 
Theoretical Framework  
Game theory 
Game theory explains the rationale of decision making where the stakeholders involved can 
make strategic decisions to get a better deal when their choices may influence the interests of 
others (Myerson, 1992). The theory is applied in psychology, politics and sociology. It is 
applied in economics to explain the decision-making process when stakeholders take decisions 
under mutual external economic conditions.  Gibbons (1992) discussed different models of 
game theory and identified five elements of the model namely, the players (i.e. stakeholders), 
information (e.g. records and messages), action (i.e. applied strategy), process (i.e. sequence of 
actions), and utility (i.e. payoff or profit).  This study uses this theory to explain why 
international hotel groups (players) dispose of their assets and undertake share repurchase 
programs (action) to manipulate the market by showing improved financial performance 
metrics (information). Hoteliers by playing this game expect stock appreciation (process) 
leading to higher financial returns (utility). Among the various types of game theory models 
(Zhang et al., 2009), this study fits the non-cooperative form that functions based on a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium model (Figure 1). In this model, player 1 (hotel groups) take the first 
action by disposing of assets. Player 1 creates imperfect information, in financially engineering 
growth in stock values. For player 2 (stock traders), the source of increased performance of the 
hotel group is not clear. In other words, player 2 takes investment decisions based on growth 
of share values, which may not necessarily relate to any sustainable increase in income streams 
or improvement in the underlying fundamentals of financial performance. .    
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Asset Disposals, Sale and Manage-back (SMBs) and Corporate Performance  
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The need to develop brand value has been a key driver of rapid expansion by hotel chains. An 
asset light structure that utilizes franchising and management agreement overcomes the capital 
constraints that limit the number of properties that may be brought into the chains portfolio. 
For the hotel owner the main benefit of a hotel brand is the volume of guests that can be 
delivered to the property (Mintel, 2016). Hotel chains loyalty programs and corporate 
agreements are the foundation of its brand value. 
The asset sale and manage back strategy pursued by the IHCs has been dubbed as the separation 
of bricks from brains (Gannon et al., 2010). Arguably, pure real estate investors may have a 
wider perspective on the best and highest use of land, for example as a site for residential 
apartment blocks. However, it maybe that the best expert is sometimes an internal property 
manager (Louko, 2004a). Alternative land use strategies may not always fit well with the 
objectives of IHCs to secure long-term management contracts on divested hotel properties.  
Hotel property differs from real estate holdings in many other businesses insofar as it is an 
integral part of the customer offering; an essential element of the delivery of accommodation 
services to customers (Roper, 2016). While hotel property values share the supply and demand 
dynamics of real estate generally, studies have shown that hotel firm values are much more 
impacted by wider economic conditions. (Lee and Jang, 2012) found that property prices 
affected hospitality firms returns only if they were subject to potential asset sales required to 
overcome financial or liquidity constraints. Even as hotel revenue growth and appreciation of 
real estate outperformed many other industry sectors in 2014/2015, the Baird/STR hotel stock 
index recorded precipitous falls in shares prices on market concerns in 2015 over a global 
economic slowdown and US interest rate hikes (Taylor, 2016). 
Asset light strategies may be more appropriate when dealing with a suite of generic properties 
(Barris, 2002), but may not necessarily be the optimal course of action where assets are integral 
to a company’s competitive position, although the risks may be mitigated by franchising the 
brand (Kachaner and Whybrew, 2014).  The resource based theory of sustainable competitive 
advantage rests on the ability of a firm to avoid imitation of their resources. This may not be 
achievable in a world where established distribution channels of hotel franchisors are 
increasingly challenged by market-dominant online travel agents (OTA’s). Mintel reported in 
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2014 that as much as 70%-80% of non-affiliated hotel bookings were sourced through OTA’s 
(Mintel, 2014). These OTA’s present an alternative choice for hotel owners to traditional chain 
affiliations. Fee growth from franchising and management agreements in China is also coming 
under pressure as Chinese groups develop their own International brands.  
Conventional wisdom suggests that the asset light course may not be optimal where assets are 
in short supply, such as is the case with premium hotels located on prime sites. Barriers to 
entry, including lack of available land, minimise the available supply of these luxury assets. 
Hilton retains direct ownership of its luxury ‘brand builders’ including, Hilton Hawaiian 
Village and the New York Hilton (Hotel Analyst, 2014). In 2016, Hilton announced its 
intention to spin-off its real estate to a new company to be called Park Hotels and Resorts. The 
new company will be the second largest publically traded REIT in the lodging industry. The 
rationale for hotel asset disposals and SMBs is not more efficient space-use or more efficient 
corporate real estate management (as may be the case with non-property specialist corporations 
generally), but rather more efficient corporate capital use.  
Risk and return trade offs 
The divestiture of real estate risk is a key motivator for adoption of an asset light strategy by 
IHCs. There is a significant body of research that indicates that stock market returns are 
negatively correlated with comparatively high levels of real estate ownership (Brounen and 
Eichholtz, 2005; Louko, 2004b; Roh, 2002). An explanation often cited is that real estate, as a 
specialized asset, may be undervalued by stock analysts and the market in general. A study of 
the UK retail sector in 2000 showed the value of real estate holdings for many companies to be 
greater than their market capitalization (Wainwright, 2000). Hence, the move by many 
corporations to divest their real property to specialist property managers. In 2012, for example, 
Woolworths transferred its 69 shopping centre’s in Australia and New Zealand into a newly-
created property company, which then listed on the stock market (Williams, 2012). In a study 
of REITs in the lodging industry that examined both top-line and bottom-line performance of 
individual hotels (Howton et al., 2012) found that REIT-owned hotels have generated superior 
profit margins to that of other lodging properties. The researchers attribute the difference to 
greater cost efficiency attributable to non-distributed operating expenses and fixed charges. 
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Higher profit margins from real estate come with higher market risk, as (Ro and Ziobrowski, 
2011) observed in their study of specialised REITs.  
As IHCs expand into new, less developed, geographical markets they must balance the risk and 
returns of different entry mode choices. While equity investment provides a high degree of 
direct control over assets and brand reputation, for the most part control in the form of 
management agreements, and not equity investments, has been the preferred model. Graf 
(2009) noted that equity investors view the entry mode choices of IHCs differently depending 
on whether the investment was being made in a developed or developing country. Management 
contracts were valued more highly by investors when associated with expansion into less 
developed countries. Franchising was the preferred choice of investments for expansion into 
developed countries.  
It has been suggested that lodging property returns are higher and more volatile than returns to 
other types of real estate (deRoos and Corgel, 1996). Asset light structures, such as 
management and franchise contracts are considered lower risk investments than leases and 
ownership. It is thought these models can deliver a better return on assets, lower profit 
volatility, greater flexibility and higher scale-driven costs savings than direct investments in 
real property (Kachaner and Whybrew, 2014). The revenue stream from a management or 
franchise contract is steadier and less variable than that of the actual hotel property where the 
owner or lessee is actually exposed to the ups and downs of the hotel property cycle (Mintel, 
2016). Sohn et al. (2013) in their study spanning the period 2002 to 2010 found that the capital 
markets assign premiums to firms that go asset light and that decreasing capital intensity 
elevates firm value. They also concluded that a focus on fee-business was effective in 
improving profitability, earnings stability and ultimately firm value. In a subsequent study 
(Sohn et al., 2014), based on the period 2002 to 2011, the researchers concluded that the asset 
light strategy enables fee based firms to quickly reap the benefits of economic recovery while 
providing protection from negative shocks when the economy is contracting. 
Capital intensity and firm value 
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The managerial finance literature suggests two competing arguments relative to capital 
intensity with respect to firm risk and performance. High levels of operating leverage can 
manifest itself in high levels of volatility in earnings due to the presence of relatively high fixed 
costs. Roh (2002) confirmed that the cash flows derived from restaurant franchising were 
subject to less volatility than the income of the restaurant itself. Conversely, high operating 
leverage acts as a profitability multiplier, enhancing earnings once already sunk costs for fixed 
assets are covered. In distinguishing the effect of operating leverage and financial distress costs 
in a study of the volatility of equity REIT returns during the financial crisis (Sun et al., 2015) 
argued that capital structures with higher debt-to-asset ratios were the predominant factor 
amplifying stock price declines, as compared to commercial real estate in general. 
Studies of restaurant franchising (Hsu and Jang, 2009) and capital intensity in the hotel and 
restaurant industries (Jae Lee and Jang, 2007) found the existence of curvilinear (inverted U-
shape relationships) between franchise proportion/capital intensity and firm profitability and 
intangible value, suggesting the existence of an optimal franchise/capital intensity proportion. 
The results propose a possibility that franchisors could maximize their profitability and 
intangible asset value with an optimal franchise/owned asset proportion.  
Lee (2008) discussed that until reaching a certain level of internationalisation expanding abroad 
does not enhance firm value, but after reaching that level, internationalisation begins to increase 
firm value. Lee speculated that this may be related to the capital-intensive nature of the hotel 
business. However, as noted by Graf (2009), IHCs generally prefer franchising and 
management agreements over riskier capital investments for overseas expansion. 
Share repurchases 
Sale and leasebacks were primarily used as a financing tool (Barris, 2002).  A key motivator 
for SLBs in the hotel industry was the potential to redirect equity capital tied up in real estate 
holdings back into further acquisitions of hotel property or fee generating investments in 
expansion of franchising agreements and management agreements. The transition to an asset 
light strategy and sale and manage-back transactions has seen a shift towards the use of released 
capital for share repurchases rather than reinvestment in business expansion. 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 






In principle, under the Miller and Modigliani proposition, investors should be indifferent 
towards returns in the form of dividends or capital gains (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). The 
proposition, however, relies on assumptions underpinning perfect capital markets such as no 
transaction costs or differing tax treatments. Corporate boards generally prefer to maintain a 
steady increase in the annual dividend. Where there is surplus cash to be distributed a special 
dividend or share buyback provides a greater degree of flexibility then non-recurring increases 
in annual dividends. Share buybacks, particularly when a program is spread over several years, 
allow managers the flexibility of timing market purchases. Part of the buyback program can 
generally be delayed or cancelled without the same adverse reactions that may follow a 
decrease in dividend pay outs from one year to the next. Investor’s capital gains may be taxed 
at lower rates then dividend income, as is the case in the US and the UK. Consequently, it may 
benefit investors to receive returns in the form of share buybacks. This form of distribution 
also allows investors the choice of timing as to when they will realise gains as opposed to the 
timing of dividend payments which are determined by the corporate board. 
A principal rationale for share buybacks is to address what management perceive as a market 
under-valuation of the organisation’s share price. IHG’s shares tripled in the period between 
2003 and 2011 when it was disposing of much of its hotel property and buying back its shares 
with the proceeds. This change in strategic direction followed the enactment of legislation in 
the UK of changes permitting the use of treasury stock, ending the prior UK requirement for 
repurchased shares to be cancelled, and bringing UK law in line with the situation in the USA. 
The announcement of a share buyback program can have a positive signalling effect (Comment 
and Jarrell, 1991; Lie, 2005; Vermaelen, 1981) especially where managers (who are presumed 
to be acting on insider knowledge) are retaining their own holdings of stocks (Chen et al., 
2014). 
Many of the finance directors in the UK’s leading companies have cited capital restructuring 
in favour of debt as the primary motive for share buyback programs (Dixon et al., 2008). The 
tax shield effects of higher gearing can lower the weighted average cost of capital (Dobbs and 
Rehm, 2005).  Higher leverage may also serve to abate investor concerns around agency costs 
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as a higher ratio of interest costs subjects management to tighter financial discipline. This was 
also a rational for releasing capital via the sale and leaseback route. 
While agency costs may potentially reduce as a consequence of capital restructuring, this is not 
always the case. Where managers are incentivized to increase earnings per share (EPS) a 
potential conflict arises unless safeguards are in place against rewards being earned as a 
consequence of eps increases that result from share buybacks. Similar issues arise where 
management hold significant share options that may benefit from restricting dividend 
payments.  By building up retained earnings the value of options can be increased and a share 
buyback program can serve to offset the dilutive effects of the exercise of options.   
Advocates of stock buybacks see repurchases as providing a greater degree of flexibility in 
comparison to capital investments and acquisitions; as a signal of confidence by management 
in the prospects for stock appreciation; an offset to dilution from share-based compensation; 
and avoidance of mal-investments in projects that do not offer positive net present values 
(Schneider and Kohlmeyer, 2015). Critics have pointed to the lack of investment in productive 
assets, research and development and acquisitions. There are concerns around agency problems 
from executive compensation packages tied to increases in earnings per share. Agency theory 
also suggests risk aversion by managers playing it safe may explain the preference for stock 
buybacks over investment. With interest rates at historical lows it has been argued that firms 
see a better return on buybacks than investing in fixed income securities (Schneider and 
Kohlmeyer, 2015) and that even borrowing to finance share repurchases is justified because 
the dividends avoided on repurchased shares exceeds the cost of borrowing.  
Notwithstanding the potential conflicts activist investors and share analysts can and do bring 
pressure on boards to complete share buybacks, even where there is no real indication that stock 
prices are intrinsically undervalued.  Analysts questioned the absence of share repurchases 
when Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide went two quarters without effecting share 
buybacks in 2014. This was despite returning dividends, special dividends and share 
repurchases of almost £10 billion over the prior ten years (www.Hotelnewsnow.com). The 
company turned in a credible performance in 2014 in terms of stock price, earnings, new room 
inventory and pipeline development as well as achieving its goal of asset sales of $3 billion 
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over 4 years.  Investor pressure, however, following the reversals in stock prices in 2015 
ultimately led to the merger talks with competitor groups and the completion of a deal with 
Marriott International. There continue to be calls from activist investors for mergers between 
the largest companies in a drive for faster growth and increased earnings (Roper, 2017). 
 
Hypothesis  
The literature review highlights the rationale and motivations for adoption of an ADSB strategy 
by IHCs.  Previous studies have found that sale and leaseback programs in financially stable 
firms have had a positive impact on corporate performance metrics. Many IHCs have sought 
to simultaneously divest themselves of perceived real estate risk arising from the ownership or 
leasing of property while continuing to exercise a high degree of control over assets through 
the use of management agreements. 
The trade-off for IHCs in contracting in size and relinquishing income streams associated with 
outright ownership or leasing of hotel properties comes with the perceived stability of less risky 
fee based business in periods of economic contraction. While Sohn et al. (2014) confirmed this 
outcome, they also found that asset light hotel group’s beta was higher during expansion 
periods, attributing this asymmetric impact to greater sensitivity of asset light firms to 
economic recovery. In periods of economic expansion, asset light firms are able to expand at a 
faster pace than traditional IHCs, while continuing to share in the rewards of increased hotel 
profitability via performance incentive fees in management agreements.  
The objective of this study is an empirical examination of the impact of an asset disposal 
strategy and associated share buyback programs on corporate performance. The study 
concentrates on testing hypothesis that suggest this strategy will lead to improved performance, 
albeit with greater instability during expansionary periods, that is in turn recognized in the form 
of higher market valuations by investors. Our first hypothesis seeks to confirm that this positive 
trend in the form of return on assets (ROA) is observed in firms adopting a strategy that seeks 
to significantly reduce their level of investment in tangible hotel assets. 
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H1a – Asset light strategies pursued by IHCs are associated with improved ROA 
performance during periods of expansion. 
H1b – Asset light strategies pursued by IHCs are associated with greater instability in 
ROA during periods of expansion. 
While both asset light IHCs and more capital intensive IHCs utilize share buyback programs 
as a means of capital restructuring, an asset light strategy presents greater opportunities for 
reduction of share capital and borrowings secured on hotel property by utilization of the excess 
proceeds of asset disposals. Traditional IHCs that maintain higher levels of real estate assets 
will generate less free cash flow than groups pursuing an active program of disposals. 
Our second hypotheses seek to confirm that a positive trend in the form of return on capital 
employed (ROCE) is observed in firms adopting a dual asset light/share repurchase strategy. 
H2a - Asset light/share buyback strategies pursued by IHCs are associated with 
improved ROCE during periods of expansion. 
H2b - Asset light/share buyback strategies pursued by IHCs are associated with greater 
instability in ROCE during periods of expansion. 
An asset light strategy entails a focus on fee based revenues. Consequently, the turnover of 
asset light IHCs is reduced as the gross revenue of owned/leased hotels is replaced with 
franchising/management fee income. As a lower overall share of previously owned/leased hotel 
revenues is captured, the net income of asset light IHCs from this source can be expected to 
reduce. Conversely, the expansion of brands via fee based agreements presents the prospect of 
significant improvement in the margin of net profit to turnover (NPM), particularly during 
periods of economic expansion. Additionally, performance incentive fees in management 
agreements enable asset light IHCs to capture a share of profit growth within hotel operations. 
Our third hypothesis is formed from these intuitive and theoretical assumptions. 
H3a - Asset light strategies pursued by IHCs are associated with improved NPM 
during periods of expansion. 
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H3b - Asset light strategies pursued by IHCs are associated with greater instability in 
NPM during periods of expansion. 
Traditional IHCs maintain a mix of fee based and owned/leased hotel revenues. The gross 
revenue recognized by traditional IHCs includes that of their owned/leased hotels. As a 
proportionally greater overall share of owned/leased hotel revenues is expected to be captured, 
we would anticipate higher adjusted profit margins for traditional IHCs, as compared with asset 
light IHCs, when the net profits of both are measured as a percentage of gross hotel revenues 
(ANPM).  Our fourth hypothesis seeks to confirm this expectation. 
H4 – Traditional IHCs capture a proportionally greater share of gross hotel receipts as 
measured by Adjusted Net Profit margins (ANPM). 
On the assumption that significant improvement in performance fundamentals is observed 
during a period of expansion, we expect to see this translated into superior risk-weighted 
returns for asset light IHCs. Consequently, we derive our final hypothesis as: 
H5 – Asset light strategies generate superior risk-weighted returns during periods of 
expansion to that of more capital intensive traditional hotel companies. 
 
Data and methods 
This study investigates the impact of the ADSB strategy on IHCs performance trends and stock 
market valuations in the period 2011-2017. The paper seeks an answer to the question of 
whether an ADSB strategy translates into improved corporate performance and market values. 
Data  
The post-crash period has been a relatively benign economic period and much of the larger (but 
by no means all) asset disposal programs of the asset light IHCs in our sample had been 
completed by 2011 – the start of our period of study. The ADSB strategy adopted by IHCs is 
primarily a feature of large capitalization branded chains. There are relatively few major hotel 
companies with a broad enough international spread, market segment diversification and brand 
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strength to pursue a strategy focused on franchising and management agreements. Construct 
validity necessitates concentration on relatively few large cap leading brands, Consequently, a 
purposive sampling technique has been used, based upon identifying multi-brand IHCs 
(Saunders et al., 2012). 
Our study is primarily focused on a portfolio of the IHCs controlling the 15 leading hotel 
brands, as listed in an MKG hospitality report dated March 2013 published in Global Hotel 
Perspectives 2014 (Hotel Analyst, 2014).  Host Inns has been acquired by BTG Hotels, a 
Chinese state owned enterprise. Although listed among the leading hotel brands, the company 
has been excluded from the sample. Recent research has suggested that cultural attitudes 
towards borrowing and high levels of government shareholdings may account for lower levels 
of gearing in Chinese listed firms (Tse and Rodgers, 2011). For these reasons and due to the 
potential distorting effect of Chinese state interventions in stock markets during the period 
under review, Hyatt hotels has been substituted for Host inns.   
The branded hotel market is estimated to account for 53% of the total hotel market 
(HotelAnalyst, 2015). The hotel companies in our sample account for approximately 30% of 
total branded hotel market in terms of room capacity. Of the companies that control the top 15 
brands, 8 are publically traded and one, Best Western, remains a private company. Our sample 
excludes Best Western (and Hilton Hotels that was privately held until 2013) and segregates 6 
listed chains (substituting Hyatt for Home Inns) into two large capitalisation portfolio groups 
consisting of:  Asset light IHCs whose revenues are primarily fee based (defined as owning or 
leasing less than 1% of hotel room capacity within their inventory of franchised/operated hotel 
properties (Table 1, Panel a).  More capital intensive traditional IHCs, being companies with 
greater than 5% of owned/lease hotel room capacity (Table 1, Panel b). 
Insert Table 1 here  
 
Research methods 
We collected data for our sample of the 4 asset light IHCs and the control group of 2 traditional 
IHCs for the period 2011 to 2017. Quarterly accounting data and monthly equity returns were 
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extracted from the Worldscope and Datastream databases. Additional data was obtained from 
10k statements or Annual reports as was any data missing from the database to avoid a potential 
source of sample selection bias. As noted below, the growth index coefficients are not 
significantly impacted by missing or negative data. Accor is listed on the Paris bourse and 
reports half-yearly. Consequently, quarterly financial data for this has been calculated by 
dividing semi-annual reports by two. Accor has been traded in the US via American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) on the OTC market since March 2015. 
To measure the relationship of performance (return) and stability (risk) with an asset light 
strategy the study utilizes three basic accounting measures of performance. ROCE has been 
preferred over return on equity (ROE) due to the distortionary impact of share buybacks at 
market value on the book value of shareholders’ funds. 
ROA - Return on total assets (operating profit/total assets) 
ROCE - Return on capital employed (operating profit/total assets-current liabilities) 
NPM – Net profit margins (net profit/turnover) 
As proposed by Hunter and Coggin (1983) and utilized by Jae Lee and Jang (2007) this study 
employs profit growth and stability indexes in place of the conventional method of calculating 
the mean and variances of accounting performance. Equations 1 and 2 used to calculate growth 
and instability indexes, respectively.   
Growth (Equation 1) 
GrowthROA = b/𝑅𝑂𝐴 (x100) 
GrowthROCE = b /𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 (x100) 
GrowthNPM= b/𝑁𝑃𝑀 (x100) 
 
GrowthROA/ROCE/NPM is the growth index of ROA/ROCE/NPM, b is the raw-score 
regression coefficient from the simple linear ROA/ROCE/NPM trend regression, and 
𝑅𝑂𝐴/ 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸/𝑁𝑃𝑀 is the arithmetic mean of ROA/ROCE/NPM time series.  
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Instability (Equation 2) 
InstabilityROA = 
σ 
ROA √1 − 𝑅2/𝑅𝑂𝐴 
InstabilityROCE = 
σ 
ROCE √1 − 𝑅2/𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸 
InstabilityNPM = 
σ 
NPM √1 − 𝑅2/𝑁𝑃𝑀 
 
Instability ROA/ROCE/NPM is the instability index of ROA/ROCE/NPM, σ 
ROA/ROCE/NPM is the standard deviation of ROA/ROCE/NPM, and R2 is the coefficient of 
determination from the simple linear ROA/ROCE/NPM trend regression (Jae, Lee and Jang, 
2007). The equation is equivalent to the relative standard error or standard error of estimate 
divided by the mean. 
As Hunter and Coggin (1983) explained this approach is unaffected by negative or zero values 
in the time series. It does not confuse stable growth or stable retrenchment with variability. The 
suggested growth statistic multiplied by 100 gives an estimate of the average percent growth 
in ROA/ROCE/NPM per unit of time (Kim et al., 1989). Additionally, the formulation assesses 
instability independently of absolute ratio levels. This study bases the simple trend analysis for 
growth and instability on 28 data points per IHC representing quarterly ROA (ROCE & NPM) 
for the seven years from 2011 through 2017. 
ANPM – Adjusted net profit margin (Net Profit/Hotel Revenues) is designed to give a relative 
indication of the impact of an asset light strategy on profit returns from gross hotel revenues. 
Hotel revenues are calculated by multiplying revenue per available room (RevPar) by the 
average number of rooms operated by the IHC during the year. 
The Sharpe ratio or index provides for the isolation of excess return per unit of total risk taken. 
This ratio goes beyond measures designed to evaluate portfolio performance within the Capital 
Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) such as the Treynor and Jensen ratios; and in considering total 
risk rather than solely systematic risk, is suited to an undiversified portfolio such as our sample 
which is concentrated within the lodging industry (Kim and Gu, 2003; Mao and Gu, 2007). 
This study has utilized monthly stock return (MSR) from 2011 to 2017. The ex-post Sharpe 
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index uses actual instead of expected returns to measure historical risk-adjusted returns. The 




   (Equation 3) 
 
Where Rp is the average return of the portfolio (% change in monthly stock prices) and Rf is 
the average monthly return of the risk free rate (3 month treasury bills) during the five year 




The mean values of the three profit growth indexes and Instability indexes based on the 
accounting ratio’s ROA, ROCE, NPM and the mean of ANPM are illustrated in Table 2 for 
asset light and traditional IHCs.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Supporting the findings of earlier studies of asset light strategies (e.g., Sohn, 2014) we find 
distinctive differences in most measures of profit growth or variability.  Hypothesis 1a 
postulated that asset light IHCs would generate greater profit growth as measured by return on 
assets, through a combination of asset reduction, market expansion and performance incentive 
fees in a period of economic recovery.  The results indicate significantly higher levels of 
average growth in ROA (based on operating profit) for the Asset Light group compared with 
the traditional group (0.687 against -1.051). Consequently, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
respect of H1a. Hypotheses 1b postulated that asset light IHCs would experience a greater level 
of instability in this measure of performance.  However, mean variances in quarterly ROA 
growth of 0.216 against 0.219 were not greatly different. The null hypothesis is accepted in 
respect of H1b. 
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Hypothesis 2a anticipated that the extensive share repurchase /debt retirement programs 
undertaken by asset light IHCs and the consequent reduction in capital employed would be 
reflected in greater growth in return on capital employed during this period.  The mean growth 
in ROCE of asset light IHCs at 0.737 was significantly greater than that of the traditional IHC 
portfolio at -1.392. Instability of ROCE for asset light IHCs at 0.266 was similar to that of 
traditional IHCs at 0.320. The null hypotheses are therefore rejected for both H2a and H2b.  
Our third hypothesis seeks to test the proposition that asset light IHCs can continue to grow 
profits as a percentage of revenue (aided by a substitution of fee income for gross hotel receipts 
in turnover figures and gains on property disposals), even while relinquishing the owner’s share 
of profits from hotel operations in favour of management agreements.  Asset light IHCs under-
performed traditional IHCs by a factor of 5 times on this measure, recording a mean growth in 
NPM of 2.896 against growth in NPM for traditional IHCs of 14.907. The difference in the 
instability of NPM growth was marginal, being 0.815 for asset light IHCs and 0.704 for 
traditional IHCs. Hypothesis 3a is consequently rejected but the null hypothesis is not rejected 
in respect of hypothesis 3b. 
Hypothesis 4 anticipated the capture by traditional IHCs of a proportionally greater share of 
gross hotel receipts in the period. With traditional IHCs reporting average net profits as 
measured by Adjusted Net Profit margins (ANPM) significantly less than asset light IHCs 
(0.656 versus 2.717), H4 is rejected. 
To measure the risk and return of the both asset light and traditional IHCs, the mean values of 
the monthly stock return and variances (risk) are provided in Table 3. The monthly stock return 
of asset light IHCs at 5.04 is ten times that of traditional IHCs at 0.47. There is a relatively 
small difference in the variance of monthly stock returns between the two groups.  
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Table 4 presents the Sharpe Ratio as a risk-adjusted performance measure for the two IHC 
portfolios in the period 2011-2015. The results reflect the superior stock performance of asset 
light IHCs as measured by the average return earned in excess of the risk-free rate per unit of 
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volatility. In general, the greater the value of the Sharpe ratio, the more attractive the risk-
adjusted return (Jae Lee and Jang, 2007). The risk adjusted stock returns for traditional IHCs 
generated significantly lower returns (little above that available from 13 week treasury bills) 
consistent with the findings of earlier industry studies (Skalpe, 2003). The results confirm the 
postulation within hypothesis 5 that asset light strategies generate superior risk-weighted 
returns during periods of expansion to that of more capital intensive traditional hotel 
companies.  
Insert Table 4 here 
 
Results of inferential statistical analysis  
In Table 5, t-tests are used to determine if statistically significant differences existed in ratio, 
market and risk-adjusted performance measures. The findings show that there is a single 
significant difference in the Instability ROCE measure at the 0.05 alpha level. Significant mean 
differences were not found in monthly stock returns either before or after adjusting for risk. 
The results of descriptive statistics are somewhat consistent across the accounting and market 
variance measures in that asset light IHCs had mostly similar levels of financial performance 
and instability to that traditional IHCs.  
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Previous research in strategic hospitality management recognised that the growth of the 
international hotel industry has been reached through the divestment of real estate portfolios 
and development of asset light market entry methods (Gannon et al., 2010; Roper, 2017). Using 
game theory, this study contributes to current knowledge of tourism studies by evaluating the 
effectiveness of asset light strategies applied by the intentional hotel against traditional IHCs. 
This study has focused on the relative impact of asset disposal and share buyback strategies on 
the performance and stability of IHCs in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  The 
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performance of four large capitalisation asset light IHCs with a control group comprised of two 
large capitalisation capital intensive traditional hotel companies was assessed. 
Prior empirical studies have found that a focus on fee-business was effective in improving 
profitability (Sohn et al., 2013); and asset light hotel groups beta was higher during expansion 
periods (Sohn et al., 2014). Our findings partially support these earlier studies, showing asset 
light strategies pursued by IHCs in the five years from 2011 to 2017 are associated with higher 
growth in most profitability measures. Asset light strategies generate superior risk-weighted 
returns to that of more capital intensive traditional hotel companies and superior risk-weighted 
returns are reflected in higher market valuations for asset light IHCs in comparison with their 
more traditional counterparts. Higher market valuations may be attributable to lower weighted 
average costs of capital, following capital restructuring via share repurchases, as much as any 
uplift deriving from the shedding of perceived real estate risk.  
Firms adopting asset disposal strategies have opted to return much of the proceeds from 
downsizing of the asset base to shareholders in the form of share buybacks. To maximise 
shareholder value, game theory would suggest that firms scale to a size where marginal returns 
on invested capital are equal to the marginal cost of capital. Alternatives to outright asset 
disposals and share buybacks pursued by some IHCs, include Hilton’s planned transfer of 
owned hotels to an independently listed REIT as well as creating a separate publicly quoted 
timeshare business. Similarly, Accor’s dual structure, combines both property ownership and 
hotel and brand management. Joint venture agreements with prospective real estate investors 
are a further alternative means of driving expansion. These alternative strategies follow the 
basic premise of portfolio theory insofar as the uncorrelated risk profiles of asset light and 
capital intensive firms offer the opportunity for diversification of portfolio risk, leaving the 
choice of risk allocation with investors.  
Our findings indicated that asset light IHCs proportionate share of hotel earnings actually 
increased as compared with traditional IHCs.  As new entrants to the international hotel markets 
begin to make their presence felt, international expansion via SMB’s may become more 
challenging. The big Chinese hotel real-estate groups such as Dalian Wanda Hotels and Resorts 
are no longer serving as expansion vehicles for Western brands, but are developing properties 
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under their own brands (Mintel, 2016). It is quite possible we may see a rebranding of major 
Chinese group’s foreign-branded hotel properties as the management and franchise contracts 
on those properties come up for renewal. 
Intangible asset values are by nature more volatile than tangible real estate. Findings from 
comparison of asset light and traditional IHCs revealed that this game is not a sound strategy. 
As Gintis (2014) discussed lack of information sharing among the agents/stakeholders leads to 
failure of the game. Hoteliers may need to revisit their strategy in disposing of the assets and 
share repurchase scheme by playing this game with higher transparency in the process and 
communicating more complete information.  Corporate managers will need to weigh carefully 
the impact on brand values of the quality of their managed hotel portfolios and the associated 
income streams. This may require a more strategic approach to asset divestment tailored to 
specific geographic and market segments in search of an optimal brand mix as the profile of 
the international hotel industry undergoes change.  
This study analyses performance during a period of economic recovery when interest rates have 
been at historic lows in the United Sates and the European Union. The business cycle may play 
a significant role in firm performance (Sohn et al., 2014; Singh and Kwansa, 1999; Singh, 
2002).  Research conducted over the course of a full real estate cycle may provide meaningful 
insights to the effectiveness of hotel segmentation and internationalization strategies.  A study 
of the relative impact of share buybacks on capital structures and financial leverage is another 
area that may yield useful results. 
While there exists a general consensus among senior corporate executives and the investment 
community of the potential benefits of an asset light strategy, there remains a debate around 
how far such a strategy should be pursued (e.g. with respect to flagship properties or economy 
branded hotels) and whether it is best achieved by transfer of owned hotels to independently 
listed entities. This debate offers a rich seam of management and accounting research as 
international competition intensifies and big new players like the Chinese hotel giants enter the 
arena. Common limitations of a study that focuses on large cap US listed international 
companies apply equally to this study. The results may not be generalizable to private or non-
US listed hotel groups.  Analysis of the performance of IHCs listed on non-US bourses (along 
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the lines of this study) or to smaller cap hotel companies and lodging REITs may add usefully 




Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 







Barris, R. (2002). Sale-Leasebacks Move to The Forefront: What Is Motivating Buyers and 
Sellers And What Are Their Preferred Methods? Briefings in Real Estate Finance, 2, 103-112. 
Brettel, K., Gaffen, D. & Rohde, D. (2015). The Cannibalised Company: How The Cult of 
Shareholder Value Has Reshaped Corporate America. In: Blanten, J. (Ed.) Reuters Special 
Report. Reuters. 
Brounen, D. & Eichholtz, P. M. A. (2005). Corporate Real Estate Ownership Implications: 
International Performance Evidence. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 30, 429-
445. 
Brown, J. R., Dev, C. S. & Zhou, Z. (2003). Broadening The Foreign Market Entry Mode 
Decision: Separating Ownership and Control. Journal of International Business Studies, 473-
488. 
Chen, H.-C., Chen, S.-S., Huang, C.-W. & Schatzberg, J. D. (2014). Insider Trading and Firm 
Performance Following Open Market Share Repurchase Announcements. Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, 41, 156-184. 
Comment, R. & Jarrell, G. A. (1991). The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction and 
Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases. Journal of Finance, 46, 
1243-71. 
Contractor, F. J. & Kundu, S. K. (1998). Modal Choice in A World of Alliances: Analysing 
Organizational Forms in The International Hotel Sector. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 29, 325-356. 
Deroos, J. A. & Corgel, J. B. (1996). Measuring Lodging-Property Performance: A Difficult 
Task with Imperfect Results. Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Quarterly, 37, 20-27. 
Dev, C. S., Erramill, M. K. & S., A. (2002). Brands Across Borders: Determining Factors in 
Choosing Franchising or Management Contracts for Entering International Markets. Cornell 
Hotel and Restaurant Quarterly, 43, 91-104. 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 






Dixon, R., Palmer, G., Stradling, B. & Woodhead, A. (2008). An Empirical Survey of the 
Motivation for Share Repurchases in The Uk. Managerial Finance, 34, 886-906. 
Dobbs, R. & Rehm, W. (2005). The Value of Share Buybacks. Mckinsey Quarterly. Mckinney. 
Economist, (2014). Business: Asset-Light Or Asset-Right?; Hotels. The Economist. London: 
The Economist Intelligence Unit N.A., Incorporated. 
Economist. (2014). Share Buybacks: The Repurchase Revolution. Economist, 13/09/2014. 
Gannon, J., Roper, A. & Doherty, L. (2010). The Impact of Hotel Management Contracting On 
Ihrm Practices: Understanding The Bricks and Brains Split. International Journal of 
Contemporary Hospitality Management, 22, 638-658. 
Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton, Nj: Princeton University 
Press. 
Gintis, H. (2014). The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and The Unification of the 
Behavioural Sciences-Revised Edition. Princeton University Press. 
Graf, N. S. (2009). Stock Market Reactions to Entry Mode Choices of Multinational Hotel 
Firms. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 28, 236-244. 
Gu, Z. (1994). Hospitality Investment Risk, Return, And Performance Indexes; A Ten-Year 
Examination. Hospitality Research Journal, 17, 17-26. 
Hotel Analyst (2014). Global Hotel Perspectives 2014. Global Hotel Perspectives. 
Www.Hotelanalyst.Co.Uk. 
Hotelanalyst (2015). Global Hotel Perspectives 2015. 
Hotelnewsnow (2014). Buyback Blues Mar Starwood Hotels' Earnings [Online]. Available: 
Http://Www.Hotelnewsnow.Com/Articles/22463/Buyback-Blues-Mar-Starwood-Hotels-
Earnings [Accessed 14/08/2016]. 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 






Howton, S. D., Howton, S. W., Lee, J. & Luo, M. (2012). Reits Ownership and Property 
Performance: Evidence from The Lodging Industry. Journal of Real Estate Portfolio 
Management, 18, 169-185. 
Hsu, L.-T. & Jang, S. (2009). Effects of Restaurant Franchising: Does an Optimal Franchise 
Proportion Exist? International Journal of Hospitality Management, 28, 204-211. 
Hunter, J. E. & Coggin, T. D. (1983). Measuring Stability and Growth in Annual Eps. Journal 
of Portfolio Management, 9, 75-78. 
Jae Lee, M. & Jang, S. (2007). Market Diversification and Financial Performance and Stability: 
A Study of Hotel Companies. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 26, 362-375. 
Kachaner, N. & Whybrew, A. (2014). When “Asset Light” Is Right [Online]. Available: 
Https://Www.Bcgperspectives.Com/Content/Articles/Business_Unit_Strategy_Value_Creatio
n_Growth_When_Asset_Light_Is_Right/#Chapter1 [Accessed 25/07/2016]. 
Kim, H. & Gu, Z. (2003). Risk-Adjusted Performance: A Sector Analysis of Restaurant Firms. 
Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 27, 200-216. 
Kim, W. C., Hwang, P. & Burgers, W. P. (1989). Global Diversification Strategy and Corporate 
Profit Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 10, 45-57. 
Lee, S. (2008). Internationalization of Us Multinational Hotel Companies: Expansion to Asia 
Versus Europe. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 27, 657-664. 
Lee, S. K. & Jang, S. (2012). The Real Estate Risk of Hospitality Firms: Examining Stock-
Return Sensitivity to Property Values. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 31, 
695-702. 
Lie, E. (2005). Operating Performance Following Open Market Share Repurchase 
Announcements. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 411-436. 
Louko, A. (2004a). Competitive Advantage from Operational Corporate Real Estate Disposals. 
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 8, 11-24. 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 






Louko, A. (2004b). Corporate Real Estate Disposal Impact On Performance Ratios. 
International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 8, 131-147. 
Mao, Z. & Gu, Z. (2007). Risk-Adjusted Stock Performance. International Journal of 
Hospitality & Tourism Administration, 8, 77-98. 
Melissen, F., Van Ginneken, R. & Wood, R.C. (2016). Sustainability Challenges and 
Opportunities Arising from The Owner-Operator Split In Hotels. International Journal of 
Hospitality Management, 54, 35-42. 
Mintel (2014). Hotel Trends - 2014. Mintel Group. 
Mintel (2016). Hotel Chain Strategy - March 2016. 
Modigliani, F. & Miller, M. H. (1958). The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and The 
Theory of Investment. American Economic Review, 48, 261. 
Myerson, R. B. (1992). On The Value of Game Theory in Social Science. Rationality and 
Society, 4(1), 62-73 
Nareit (2010). Reits: Real Estate with A Return Premium. Washington, D.C.: National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
Page, T. (2007). ‘Asset-Light’— Managing or Leasing? Journal of Retail & Leisure Property, 
6, 97-99. 
Ro, S. & Ziobrowski, A. J. (2011). Does Focus Really Matter? Specialized Vs. Diversified 
Reits. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 42, 68-83. 
Roh, Y. S. (2002). Size, Growth Rate and Risk Sharing as The Determinants of Propensity to 
Franchise In Chain Restaurants. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 21, 43-56. 
Roper, A. (2016). Interview with Richard Solomons, Ceo Ihg Group. In: Roper, A. (Ed.) 
Icharm Distinguished Speakers Series. London: London Geller College of Hospitality and 
Tourism, University of West London. 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 






Roper, A. (2017). Vertical Disintegration in The Corporate Hotel Industry. Current Issues in 
Tourism, 20, 1-6. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. & Adrian, T. (2012). Research Methods for Business Students, Essex, 
England, Pearson Education Limited. 
Schneider, D. K. & Kohlmeyer, J. M. (2015). Stock Buybacks: Is Practice Explained by 
Management Theory? Journal of Business and Accounting, 8, 64-75. 
Singh, A. J. (2002). The Evolution of Innovative Debt and Equity Structures: The Securitisation 
of Us Lodging Real Estate Finance. Briefings In Real Estate Finance, 2, 139. 
Singh, J. A. & Kwansa, F. A. (1999). Financing The Lodging Industry In The Next Millennium. 
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 18, 415-25. 
Skalpe, O. (2003). Hotels and Restaurants - Are The Risks Rewarded? Evidence from Norway. 
Tourism Management, 24, 623-634. 
Sohn, J., Tang, C.-H. & Jang, S. (2013). Does The Asset-Light and Fee-Oriented Strategy 
Create Value? International Journal of Hospitality Management, 32, 270-277. 
Sohn, J., Tang, C.-H. & Jang, S. (2014). Asymmetric Impacts of the Asset-Light and Fee-
Oriented Strategy: The Business Cycle Matters! International Journal of Hospitality 
Management, 40, 100-108. 
Sun, L., Titman, S. D. & Twite, G. J. (2015). Reit and Commercial Real Estate Returns: A 
Post-Mortem of the Financial Crisis. Real Estate Economics, 43, 8-36. 
Taylor, C. (2016). These Hotel Stocks Could Help Investors Sleep at Night. Fortune Magazine. 
New York: Fortune Magazine. 
Tse, C.-B. & Rodgers, T. (2011). Can Corporate Tax Shields Explain the Long-Term 
Borrowing Behaviour of Chinese Listed Firms? International Review of Financial Analysis, 
20, 103-112. 
Van Ginneken, R. (2011). Asset Light: Common Sense or Construct Impossible? Netherlands: 
Academy of Hotel Management, Breda University of Applied Sciences, 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: 






Vermaelen, T. (1981). Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling: An Empirical 
Study. Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 138-83. 
Wainwright, S. (2000). Off Balance Sheet Property Ownership Structures: Releasing Capital 
from Operational Portfolios Through Divestment. Journal of Corporate Real Estate, 2, 330-
342. 
Whittaker, C. (2008). Hotel Operator Motives In UK Sale And Leaseback/Management-Back 
Transactions. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 27, 641-648. 
Williams, K. (2012). Woolworths Spins Off Property Assets. The Australian. 
Yu, H.-Y. (2013). Extended Stay Jumps In Debut After $565 Million Ipo. Bloomberg, 
13/11/2013. 
Yu, H.-Y., Picker, L. & Brandt, N. (2014). Blackstone’s La Quinta Rises After Pricing Stock 
Sale Low. Bloomberg. 
Yu, H.-Y., Picker, L. & Ruhle, S. (2013). Blackstone’s Hilton Raises $2.35 Billion In Record 
Hotel Ipo. Bloomberg. 
Zhang, H. Q., Heung, V. C., & Yan, Y. Q. (2009). Play or Not To Play—An Analysis Of The 
Mechanism Of The Zero-Commission Chinese Outbound Tours Through A Game Theory 
Approach. Tourism Management, 30(3), 366-371. 
Bourke, J. G., Izadi, J., & Olya, H. (2020). Failure of play on asset disposals and share buybacks: Application of game theory in the international hotel market, 





Table 1. Asset Light and Traditional IHCs (international hotel chains) information 




% of owned/leased hotel rooms in  
2013 
Panel a) Asset Light IHCs (<1% owned/leased hotels) 
Choice Hotels International CHH Comfort, Quality 4 328 Fee based hotel franchising 
company 
InterContinental Hotels Group IHG Holiday Inn, Express by Holiday Inn, 
Crowe Plaza 
4 533 Less than 1% owned/leased rooms 
Marriott International MAR Marriott International, Courtyard by 
Marriott 
1 341 Less than 1% owned/leased rooms 
Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation 
WYN Days Inn, Super8 Motels, Ramada 5 411 Less than 1% owned/leased rooms 
Panel b) Traditional IHCs (>5% owned/leased hotels) 
Accor AC.PA Ibis (Megabrand) 3 182 >35%  
Hyatt Hotel Corporation H Grand Hyatt, Hyatt Regency, Hyatt Place 5 147 >17% 
Note: Panel a) identifies the asset light IHCs whose revenues are primarily fee based (defined as owning or leasing less than 1% of hotel room capacity within 
their inventory of franchised/operated hotel properties). Panel b) illustrates more capital intensive traditional IHCs, being companies with greater than 5% of 
owned/lease hotel room capacity. 
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Table 2. Means of profit growth, instability and adjusted net profit margins (Quarterly data) 
Measures Asset Light IHCs Traditional IHCs 
a)  Profit growth means  
 
Growth return on assets (ROA) 0.687 -1.051 
Growth return on capital employed (ROCE) 0.737 -1.392 
Growth net profit margins (NPM) 2.896 14.907 
   
b)  Instability means  
 
Instability return on assets (ROA) 0.216 0.219 
Instability return on capital employed (ROCE) 0.266 0.320 
Instability net profit margins (NPM) 0.815 0.704 
   
c)  adjusted net profit margins (ANPM %) 2.717 0.656 
Note: Section a) Profit growth means represents the growth index of three ratios including 
ROA, ROCE and NPM. These indexes are calculated by dividing the raw-score regression 
coefficient (b) from the simple linear ROA, ROCE and NPM trend regression by the mean of 
ROA, ROCE and NPM time-series. Section b) Instability means is the instability index of 
ROA, ROCE and NPM, which is calculated with standard deviation (σ), Coefficient of 
determination from the simple linear ROA, ROCE and NPM trend regression (R-squared), and 
mean of ROA, ROCE, and NPM time series. Section C) adjusted net profit margin % (ANPM) 
is based on turnover calculated by multiplying revenue per available room (RevPar) by the 
average number of rooms operated by the IHC during the year. 
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Table 3. Market-based measures for performance and risk (2011-2017) 
Market measure Asset Light IHCs Traditional IHCs 
Stock returns (SR)% 
 
5.040 0.470 
Variance of monthly stock returns (VMSR) 
 
0.052 0.043 
Note: SR is based on the monthly percentage changes in stock prices from the previous month; 
and VSR is the standard deviation of the monthly SR. 
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Table 4. Risk-adjusted performance by the Sharpe Index (2011-2017) 
Panel Ri Rf Rp σi Sharpe Index (SI) 
Asset Light IHCs 0.050 0.004 0.046 0.052 0.888 
Traditional IHCs 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.043 0.010 
Note: In the above table, Ri is monthly percentage changes in stock price (return) of hotel 
portfolio i; Rf is monthly risk-free rate (monthly mean of 13-week Treasury Bill rates); Rp is 
average excess monthly return on hotel portfolio i (Rp = Ri _ Rf): σi is the standard deviation of 
average monthly return of hotel sector I and SI is the Sharpe Index for the hotel sector i and 
calculated as follows; (SI = Rp/σi). 
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Table 5. Results of independent samples t-tests 
Accounting measure t-statistic P-value 
Growth 
Growth return on assets (ROA) -0.780 0.436 
Growth return on capital employed (ROCE) -0.623 0.533 
Growth net profit margins (NPM) -1.429 0.155 
 
Instability   
Instability return on assets (ROA) -0.065 0.948 
Instability return on capital employed (ROCE) 2.004* 0.048 
Instability net profit margins (NPM) 0.015 0.987 
 
Adjusted Net Profit Margin (ANPM) -0.705 0.481 
   
Market measure   
Monthly stock return (MSR) 1.282 0.201 
Variance of monthly stock returns (VMSR)  1.441 0.051 
 
Risk-Adjusted Performance   
Sharpe Index 1.303 0.194 
Note: *p<0.05. 
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Figure 1. Non cooperative game theory with incomplete information: the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium model 
